Background: Joint investment has increasingly become a popular investment method
for venture capitalists. From the two traditional perspectives of investors and start-ups, research on
Joint Venture Capital in the past 40 years has achieved rich results. Most recent literature is based
on research from the perspective of organisational economics, which further advances the vertical
development of research on Joint Venture Capital.
Objective: The objective of this paper is to review research topics and core literature on Joint Venture
Capital from the perspective of organisational economics, and through introducing the model
of venture capitalists' ‘bounded rationality’ and evolutionary game in the joint investment risk
analysis. This paper distinguishes the influence of the game model on the formation of joint investment.
Finally, it reaches a conclusion and suggests a direction for future research.
Methods: This paper finds and reviews literature on joint venture capital and dynamic game model
of joint investment risk that is collated to reduce the actual risk assumed by each investor. Additionally,
the paper summarises research topics and progress from the perspective of organisational
economics to identify possible research directions for the future.
Results: Based on the evolutionary game method for analysis of the model of joint investment, the
following conclusion is drawn: the greater the heterogeneity of the participating entities, the smaller
the unit conflict cost benefit and the greater the probability of successful joint venture investment.
The joint investment operation mechanism will also be maintained on a long-term and stable
Conclusion: From the perspective of organisational economics, the latest research on Joint Venture
Capital has extensively absorbed new research results of relevant disciplines. Joint Venture Capital
activities can be understood from a broader perspective and with new insights, which reflect complex
and dynamic interaction and correlative dependence on network members. To establish a more
successful joint investment model, the paper introduces a relatively novel evolutionary game method
for analysis of the joint investment model.