Parking with Discount: Generalized Oligopoly Model with Influence Coefficients
Pp. 3-28 (26)
Vitaliy V. Kalashnikov-Jr, Daniel Flores Curiel and Vyacheslav V. Kalashnikov
In this chapter, we consider an oligopolistic model for parking lots
with conjectures concerning the price variations depending upon the agents’
offered parking space increase or decrease, given an existing exogenous shop
driven demand, which may be affected by a parking discount for shop
customers. Taking into account piecewise linear cost functions, which is quite
natural assumption for parking lots, we are able to elaborate existence of an
exterior equilibrium. Moreover, under some natural assumptions we are able
to introduce conjectured or interior equilibrium. And we prove the existence
and uniqueness of it. The concept of equilibrium with the conjectures is
different from the classical Cournot-Nash one. We can establish that there
exists a unique interior (conjectured) equilibrium (which is different from the
classical Cournot-Nash equilibrium) in a model where firms have a piecewise
linear cost function.
Capacity, consistent conjectural variations equilibrium, demand
structure, exterior equilibrium, homogeneous good, influence coefficients,
interior equilibrium, mixed oligopoly, parking discount, parking lot.
Department of Economics, Autonomous University of Nuevo Leon (UANL), Mederos, Ave. Lazaro Cardenas S/N, Monterrey, Nuevo Leon, Mexico.